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GATEKEEPERS, CULTURAL CAPTIVES, OR KNAVES? 
CORPORATE LAWYERS THROUGH DIFFERENT LENSES 
 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: REMEMBERING CLARK CLIFFORD 
 
 Decades ago, I read an interview with Clark Clifford, the 
revered Washington lawyer who was facing widely-publicized 
charges that he knowingly aided a corporate client (a foreign 
banking institution) in violating federal regulatory disclosure 
laws.1 Clifford ended the interview by acknowledging that any 
reasonable person hearing the facts would come away with only 
two possible interpretations: either Clifford was thoroughly venal 
or incredibly stupid.  By most all accounts he was neither, and 
thus was asking the reader to reach deeper for a more 
sympathetic understanding of his behavior.  
This was a time when the ugly domestic savings and loan 
scandals of the 1980s were just winding down.  Observers were 
famously asking “where were the lawyers?” to demand more 
serious legal and disciplinary sanctions against the so-called 
gatekeepers who enabled (or closed their eyes to) so much 
shameless financial wrongdoing.2  As a corporate/securities 
scholar, I was fascinated by the gatekeeper question and, having 
 
*  Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  My thanks 
to the participants at the Stein Colloquium for their comments and the stimulating conversation. 
1  David E. Rosenbaum, A Charm for Plebian and Patrician, N.Y. Times C-5 (July 30, 1992). 
2  See Lincoln Sav. & Loan v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 991, 920 (D.D.C. 1990)(Sporkin, J.).  The term 
“gatekeeper” had caught on in academic analysis to describe the admixture of legal and 
reputational threats that would cause influential persons (particularly investment bankers, auditors 
and lawyers) to refuse to allow clients and others to violate the law by withholding essential 
services.  See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Liability Strategy, 2 
J. L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986). 
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been at the SEC before academia, instinctively weighed in on the 
arguments largely on the pro-enforcement side.  But I was also 
taken by Clifford’s lament.  At the time I was doing research on the 
application of social and cognitive psychology to various topics in 
business and finance, from which I eventually surmised that there 
might be good psychological explanations for why a lawyer like 
Clifford could be so close to a client’s situation that he could miss 
wrongdoing risks that would seem plain from a greater distance.  
So in 1993 I published a law review article that examined the 
state of mind standards under the federal securities laws for 
professional aiding and abetting (the most common charge 
against lawyers), making the claim that highly-engaged lawyers 
may not always have the level of actual awareness necessary for 
liability in light of then-contemporary psychological research, 
circumstantial evidence of complicity notwithstanding.3   
 To my knowledge, this was the first article to apply social 
cognition research to the professional responsibilities of 
corporate lawyers.4  For a decade, at least, a handful of legal 
scholars had been mining what was coming to be known as 
behavioral economics for tractable insights on judgment and 
decision making to apply to various other legal subjects,5 so my 
move in this direction was not entirely pioneering.  But the 
corporate field posed unique challenges for a user of these 
materials.  After years of passive-aggressive disregard, there was 
now massive resistance from orthodox law and economics 
 
3 Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ 
Responsibility for Client Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75 (1993).  I was still pro-enforcement, and so 
this inference was by way of calling for reform with a more sophisticated approach to 
intentionality. I extended the argument shortly thereafter in Donald C. Langevoort, The 
Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 
63 Brook. L. Rev. 629 (1997)(focusing on group-level biases).. 
4  There was already an influential literature in the “law and society” movement looking at the 
beliefs and behaviors of corporate lawyers by sociologists and cultural anthropologists, including 
Robert Nelson’s monumental work PARTNERS WITH POWER (1988).  See pp. --- infra. 
5  In 1998 I published a literature review of this early work, which had already grown in 
prominence and quantity.  Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship—A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998).   
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scholars arguing that the heuristics, biases and other cognitive 
traits that were being identified with such fanfare had no 
purchase in competitive marketplace settings that bountifully 
rewarded rationality and harshly punished flawed thinking.6  That 
would presumably include corporate lawyers, contrary to what I 
was claiming. That was just one of the difficulties in making an 
argument like mine. Other commentators—convinced of 
widespread lawyer mendacity in the scandals—seemed to want 
no part of psychological excuses for enabling client wrongdoing.  
Don’t be naïve, they were saying.  It was all just about unchecked 
greed and envious lawyers who wanted in on the action.  The legal 
system was the weak point, not the human psyche.7  
Fast forward to today, where work in psychology and 
behavioral economics is regularly invoked by scholars writing 
about lawyers’ professional responsibility, corporate and 
otherwise.8 To adherents, at least, there seem to be many 
possibilities for adaptive biases to affect marketplace behavior 
and the actions of economic elites without being washed out by 
the detergent of market discipline and efficiency. Behavioral 
ethics has now become an academic sub-discipline of its own.9 
 
6  See Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions and their 
Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 313 (1986).   Richard Posner later elaborated on 
this theme.  Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1551 (1998). 
7 Less than a decade later, the massive Enron scandal (with lawyers again allegedly involved) 
brought the issue back to both public and scholarly attention.  See Milton C. Regan Jr., 
Teaching Enron, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1139 (2005).  This was a focal point in drawing more 
scholarly attention to lawyers’ behavior. 
8  E.g., PAUL BREST & LINDA H. KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING AND 
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT (2010); Paula Schaefer, Behavioral Legal Ethics for Corporate 
Counsel, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1 (2019); Jennifer Robbennnolt, Behavioral Ethics Meets Legal 
Ethics, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 75 (2015); Andrew Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal 
Ethics, 90 Ind. L.J. 1639 (2015); Catherine O’Grady, Behavioral Legal Ethics, Decision Making, 
and the New Attorney's Unique Perspective, 15 Nev. L.J. 671 (2015); Jennifer Robbennolt & Jean 
Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1107 (2013); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral 
Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 St. Louis L. Rev. 971 (2007); Sung Hui Kim, 
Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 411 (2008). 
9  E.g., Max Bazerrman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of 
Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 Ann. Rev. L & Soc. Sci. 85 (2012); Robbennolt, supra. 
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 For all this progress, however, I am not sure that the 
particular questions about lawyers that bothered me long ago 
have been well answered.  In my writing on the subject, I still hold 
to the view that various cognitive (and cultural) biases lead many 
lawyers—including, and maybe even especially, elite ones—to 
deflect, normalize and rationalize actions that are either illegal or 
unethical without compromising their internal self-image as good, 
responsible people and good, responsible lawyers.10  The unifying 
theme is the extraordinary pervasiveness of self-deception and 
hypocrisy in professional and other high-status lives.  That said, I 
am still sensitive to the claim that the point of view I take—in the 
now popular genre of “good people do bad things”—is naïve.  
Maybe what I attribute to moral blind spots is more often a 
conscious and thus blameworthy form of giving in to pressure and 
temptation, maybe even sociopathic.11    
 This lingering unease was pricked by a recent pair of 
articles by two British researchers, Steven Vaughan and Emma 
Oakley, who spoke with a number of elite London-based solicitors 
about the role of ethics in high-end corporate practice.12  While no 
one, of course, said they would ever enable unlawful behavior by a 
client (and might even draw the line at extremely troubling but 
lawful client behavior), they seemed otherwise completely 
 
10  For my book-length treatment of this ideas as they play out in business and finance generally, 
see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET AND 
THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (2016); on in house lawyers in particular, see Donald C. 
Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise Risk and the Financial 
Crisis, 2012 Wisc. L. Rev. 495 (2012). 
11  I was also jolted reading an article by a research team including Linda Klebe Trevino, a 
pre-eminent organizational behaviorist, describing the behavior of sales managers at a 
particular firm who altered reporting routines to falsify information about performance sent 
up to senior management.  Niki A. den Nieuwenboer, Joao Vieira da Cunha & Linda Klebe 
Trevino, Middle Managers and Corruptive Routine Translation: The Social Production of 
Deceptive Performance, 28 Org. Sci. 781 (2017). They did this through pressure on their 
subordinates.  While this setting was ripe for ambiguation and cognitive distortion of the 
sort now largely taken for granted in management studies, the article reports a disturbingly 
high degree of candor that what they were doing was wrong, yet they were doing it anyway.   
12  Steven Vaughan & Emma Oakley, “Gorilla Exceptions” and the Ethically Apathetic Corporate 
Lawyer, 19 Legal Ethics 50 (2016); Emma Oakley & Steven Vaughan, In Dependence: The 
Paradox of Professional Independence and Taking Seriously the Vulnerabilities of Lawyers in 
Large Corporate Law Firms, 46 J. L. & Soc. 83 (2019). 
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disinterested in any further public-regarding ethical dimension to 
their practice.  Clients are in charge: full stop.  The authors see 
some psychological distancing going on, but were still struck by 
how candidly the elite lawyers roundly rejected the idea that 
ethics has (or should have) much relevance at all to their work, 
given so much professional rhetoric otherwise. If apathy prevails, 
maybe the “good people” category deserves to be truncated when 
it comes to responsibility for bad things, suggesting something 
close to conscious indifference.   
 These are big issues, and this is a small essay.  Here, I simply 
want to move things forward in the study of the professional 
responsibility of corporate lawyers in two ways that are 
somewhat related.  One is to push harder on consciousness by 
looking more closely at the lengthy continuum—not a binary 
yes/no—in the awareness of wrongdoing risk as heavily 
influenced by the “slippery slope.” That is a layman’s intuition put 
to use well beyond academic research: armchair philosophers 
have long understood that the road to hell is not only paved with 
good intentions but starts in small, often unconscious steps that 
gradually grow larger and hard to stop.  Looking at corporate 
lawyers’ professional responsibility through this lens has some 
interesting, and as far as I can tell, under-explored implications 
that help us understand the source of ethical apathy.   
 The other is to consider the possibility that diminished 
interest in gatekeeping ethics among private practitioners might 
be offset by greater embrace of the possibility by in-house 
lawyers.  The remarkable ascension of the general counsel in 
authority and status in the corporate setting is something about 
which many scholars and practitioners have written, mostly from 
a sociological perspective.  But there has emerged in recent years 
a different lens for the empirical examination of corporate 
lawyers, taking the tools of financial economics to seek 
correlations (and maybe causation) between identifiable lawyer 
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characteristics and outcomes for the company in terms of (for 
example) its legal exposure.13  There is some hopeful news in this 
research, albeit heavily contingent on the company’s governance 
structure, broadly conceived.  So I end by suggesting that, while 
the effort in normative legal ethics to enlist corporate lawyers in 
more than a legalistic conception of gatekeeping has failed, 
corporate governance and corporate ethics—surprisingly, 
perhaps—have some potential to enable gatekeeping general 
counsels in a way that filters down to the demand for ethically-
sensitive outside counsel as well. Good gatekeepers are not 
necessarily facing extinction, though stronger species 
preservation efforts are surely in order. 
 
II. BEHAVIORAL ETHICS AND SLOW DEGRADATION  
 
 The diagnosis that would-be gatekeepers have surrendered 
to ethical apathy should surprise no one.  As a matter of simple 
economics, clients pay the bills and normally prefer that the 
professionals they retain facilitate—not frustrate—their chosen 
ends.  Intense competition among skilled lawyers forces them into 
acquiescence. Absent countervailing regulatory or disciplinary 
pressures—which have never been all that strong—what is left is 
professional integrity, which too easily gives way to norms that 
are more conducive to competitive success.  Numerous legal 
scholars have told versions of this devolution story, from varying 
disciplinary perspectives.14   
 To be sure, we would not expect corporate lawyers to 
willfully facilitate client fraud when it exposes them to serious 
 
13  See pp. --- infra. 
14  E.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(2006); Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 
Md. L. Rev. 869 (1990); Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second 
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1867 (2008). 
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legal or reputational risks.  When and why that occasionally 
happens anyway is the Clark Clifford problem.  And as mentioned 
earlier, the puzzle there is one of good faith: is what goes on 
cognitively really about blind spots, or instead something more 
culpable?  Answering that addresses both the legal issue when the 
lawyer seems to have rendered substantial assistance to client 
misbehavior and—in a larger category of situations—professional 
judgments about the apathetic lawyers who sit idly by while 
clients threaten the common good, lawfully or not.  So in this 
section I revisit the culpability problem that has for so long 
bothered me.   
 The behavioral approach to ethics is a lively field with a 
progressive research agenda that identifies much behavior that is 
still only dimly understood, so both broad generalizations and 
confident conclusions are unwise.  But in a rough sense it 
deserves the organizing description that it is about good people 
doing bad things—there aren’t so many bad apples as bad 
barrels.15  That is to say, ordinary (non-sociopathic) people are 
naturally inclined to be reasonable and honest but easily tempted 
otherwise by self-serving inference, especially in the face of strong 
situational incentives and pressures.  People cheat less than cold 
economic calculations would suggest, but more than they should 
under common ethical norms.  The main research task is to 
discover, by manipulating situational variables, how and when 
ordinary behavior turns better or worse than this baseline.  The 
result over the past four decades or so is a rich body of insights.  
There are both popular and scholarly books available; for lawyers 
and legal scholars, Yuval Feldman’s recent The Law of Good 
People, treats the subject in depth.16   
 
15   Linda Klebe Trevino et al., (Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 Ann. Rev. Psych. 635 
(2014). 
16  YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING THE STATE’S ABILITY TO 
REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2018).  See also, e.g., MAX BAZERMAN & ANN TENBRUNSEL, 
BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011). 
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 For our purposes, perhaps the most interesting question in 
behavioral ethics is one of consciousness: how much in the way of 
ethical and legal judgment and decision making happens outside 
of consciousness, so that what is processed within awareness is 
something of an illusion.  The research suggests that there is a 
largely amount of automaticity to mental processing, only partly 
(if that) subject to the force of cognitive will.  This, in turn, has a 
strong temporal dimension.  Depending on situational 
circumstances, many ethical challenges are initially processed so 
that the ethical dimension is hidden from awareness, not 
triggering moral anxiety at all.  This is pure blind-spot territory, 
such that the individual or group’s good intentions go 
unchallenged.  Sooner or later, the ethical danger cues may come 
closer to consciousness but dismissed or downplayed by a 
combination of natural cognitive conservatism and motivated 
inference (we are often slow to understand what we don’t really 
want to know). This is often referred to as ethical fading.17  With 
more evidence, there may finally be some awareness, although 
rationalizations and denial may still blunt full realization of what 
now may be an ethical or legal mess.  If and when there finally is a 
more unfiltered awareness, the actor is in deep.  Then, often 
enough, comes the conscious (though still probably rationalized) 
cover-up.18 
 This temporal continuum is a challenge to lawyers and 
ethicists used to looking for simple accounts of dispositional 
blameworthiness.  Awareness is gradual and delayed, often until it 
is too late to avoid harm.  This is a misfit with many legal 
constructs based explicitly on awareness,19 like bad faith, and 
certainly points in the direction of lessened culpability even 
 
17  Ann Tenbrunsel & David Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical 
Behavior, 17 Soc. Justice Res. 223 (2004). 
18  For a classic early work in social psychology describing the institutional manifestation of this, 
see Barry Staw, Knee Deep in Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course 
of Action, 16 Org. Behav. & Human Dec. Processes 27 (1978). 
19  See Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, supra, at 43-45. 
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though the decision might be described as negligent or perhaps 
even reckless.  This is why behavioralists use the good people/bad 
things locution.  Of course we can and often do blame people 
anyway, making an example of them as a lesson to others who 
might then be more cognitively awoke.  But deterrence doesn’t 
necessarily work that way absent draconian threats, in-the-
moment interventions, or intrusive monitoring, all of which 
generate their own problems.  In day-to-day routines it is hard to 
instill more ethical awareness in people who are wedded to the 
assumption that they are good and all is well.  Moreover, the act of 
judging awareness after the fact of some ethical failure is 
hopelessly biased by hindsight, which makes it hard to learn from 
experience. On-going work in organizational behavior and 
compliance design tries hard to overcome all this, and there are 
some promising steps.20  But it remains a challenge, especially in 
high-velocity business environments populated by aggressive 
risk-takers.21   
  There is so much more to be said about all of this, but the 
interested reader has more than enough to choose from 
elsewhere to go more deeply into the research.  As noted at the 
outset, my question is about relatively how often this blind spot 
account accurately describes problematic ethical and legal 
behavior as opposed to a more deliberate, consciously calculated 
explanation. We can assume that there are plenty of instances of 
both, but is there anything to say about the relative distribution?   
 There are various ways of addressing the consciousness 
question, none entirely dispositive.  Researchers acknowledge 
that laboratory experiments don’t get at this particularly well.  
 
20  See Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes.  Why Compliance Programs Fail and How to Fix Them, 117 
Harv. Bus. Rev. (March-April 2018); David Hess, Ethical Infrastructure and Evidence-based 
Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from Empirical Evidence. 12 
NYU J. L. & Bus. 317 (2017). 
21  See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 933 (2017).  This is 
a particular challenge in internal efforts to deter high-impact white collar crime.  See Todd Haugh, 
The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2018). 
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Asking wrongdoers to recall their thought process—the approach 
of Eugene Soltes’ important book Why They Do It: Inside the Mind 
of the White Collar Criminal22--is helpful, but one gets the 
impression that wrongdoers (especially after a period of 
punishment) might not really have the self-insight or recollection 
to answer accurately, and may be motivated to construct an 
account in hindsight that serves purposes other than accuracy. 
Recall that even with significantly impaired awareness at the 
beginning of and through much of the course of the misbehavior, 
the misconduct may well end with some recognition of guilt, 
however softened by lingering rationalizations.  Even with that, 
Soltes finds substantial variations in the stories, some more 
consistent with the cognitive approach,23 others more jaded.  
 
  B.  The Slippery Slope 
  
 In making the case for impaired awareness, I have long 
found the idea of the slippery slope compelling.  As noted earlier, 
it is the idea—amply found in folk wisdom as well as social 
science research—that most people will not often go immediately 
from their ordinary good behavior to serious impropriety, even 
under strong situational pressure.  But they will engage in minor 
transgressions, finding ample ways to justify the small steps as 
not really improper at all.24  Once the first step is taken, however, 
the line as to what is permissible moves because of the 
rationalization—now that becomes the baseline.  The next 
temptation is measured not by the starting point, but the revised 
definition of ethical or legal acceptability.  And so on, as what is 
 
22  EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL 
(2016). 
23  Id. at 58 (neuroscience perspectives); 155 (cognitive dissonance); 257-58 (self-deception). 
24  David Welsh et al., The Slippery Slope: A Self-regulatory Examination of the Cumulative 
Effects of Minor Ethical Transgressions, 100 J. App. Psych. 114 (2015). 
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done becomes more harmful. This bears substantial kinship with 
the temporal account for delayed awareness, and draws from 
work on commitment biases, cognitive dissonance and the like for 
why each subsequent step becomes easier (and stopping so much 
harder) down an increasingly steep and icy slope.  The underlying 
idea is a gradual descent into corruption, not a discrete choice.   
 Much work in behavioral ethics invokes this kind of 
gradualism.  The famous social psychologist John Darley drew 
from it in a notable law review article describing how 
corporations become miscreants.25  Of particular note to 
corporate lawyers, a study by two financial economists, Catherine 
Schrand and Sarah Zechman, looked at companies that found 
themselves in legal trouble with the SEC and found fairly 
consistent patterns of accounting choices that at the outset were 
plausible (if aggressive), with intermediate steps that only 
gradually  over time crossed the line  to financial misreporting.26  
That is hard data evidence for the behavioral side. 
 Schrand and Zechman found something else interesting.  
There is lots of social science evidence for many corporate 
executives exhibiting an excess of self-confidence and over-
optimism, an inflated sense of personal (or senior management 
team) efficacy.  Firms with overconfident CEOs and CFOs, they 
found, were more likely to take the first steps, and end up in 
trouble.  That makes sense: to the genuinely overconfident, the 
first steps (aggressive recognition of income or minimized costs) 
would be perceived as honest and realistic.  Overconfidence has 
emerged as the best example in behavioral economics of an 
adaptive bias, i.e. a trait that is not entirely rational but 
nonetheless promotes competitive success.  It is thus a counter-
example to the idea that marketplace pressures wash out all 
 
25  John Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 
70 Brook. L. Rev. 1177 (2005). 
26  Catherine Schrand & Sarah Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to 
Financial Misreporting, 15 J. Acct’g & Econ. 311 (2012). 
12 
 
biases that interfere with the economists’ ideal of Bayesean 
rationality. 
 I have long relied on both overconfidence and the slippery 
slope in making the case for behavioral ethics.27  In a strikingly 
evocative way, neuroscientists have now joined in.28  Using 
magnetic imaging of the brain during ethics-related laboratory 
experiments, they have found that the amygdala is normally 
strongly activated by ethical stress (pressures to misbehave).  
That emotions-driving portion of the brain plays a big role in 
doing what’s right.  But if there is a small step toward cheating, 
the level of activation goes down slightly in the next opportunity.  
This goes on and on, down the slippery slope. Gradually, the 
amygdala’s electrical energy dims to indifference.   
 The study of slippery slopes in behavioral ethics tends to be 
focused on discrete choices that lead to a wrongful act.  In that 
framing, it does weigh in on the side of diminished or delayed 
awareness.  But it raises an interesting question if we extend the 
timeline.  Suppose, over many years perhaps, a person makes 
gradual ethical compromises down the slippery slope in pursuit of 
competitive success, without suffering any serious penalty.   When 
ethical (or legal) stresses arise again, does the decision-making 
reset to the starting point of innocence or instead, do all the prior 
compromises accumulate, cognitively, so that they are essentially 
starting out part way down, already unbalanced?   
 If so, it raises the possibility that character becomes 
corrupted by earlier ethical compromises even when unrelated to 
the particular dilemma at hand.  Then the question becomes 
whether this priming brings the person sooner to an actual 
awareness that they are cheating, as they have done before, or 
 
27  See Langevoort, SELLING HOPE, supra, at 26-27, 35-37. 
28  Neil Garrett et al., The Brain Adapts to Dishonesty, 19 Nature Neuroscience 1727 (2016).  For a 
commentary, see Jan B. Engelmann & Ernst Fehr, The Slippery Slope of Dishonesty, 19 Nature 
Neuroscience 1543 (2016). 
13 
 
whether this whole process stays out of consciousness.  If the 
former, it suggests that habits of compromise gradually impair 
character generally, perhaps with less cognitive resistance to the 
implications. In other words, more unfiltered wrongdoing, 
contrary to the behavioral account—people willing and able to 
admit, to themselves at least and maybe to others, that they had 
greater awareness that they were cheating from the start, but had 
largely stopped caring (i.e., ethical apathy). 
 
  C.  Corporate Lawyers 
 
 So we now turn this account specifically to the world of 
corporate lawyers and their capacity as gatekeepers.  Though I am 
by no means suggesting that that ethical compromises are 
everyday occurances, lawyers do seem to get into legal and ethical 
muck often enough, whether in the form of insider trading29 or the 
facilitating of client fraud, as in the opinion mills that churn out 
false representations of legal compliance with resale restrictions 
under the securities laws so as to enable unlawful distributions 
that too often take the form of pump and dump.30  A 60 Minutes 
sting operation that showed multiple New York lawyers more 
than ready to help hide the unsavory identity of a prospective 
client wanting to engage in a high-end real estate transaction (and 
actually led to bar discipline against some of them) surely 
 
29  Even when the lawyer in question is the company’s insider trading compliance officer.  See 
SEC Charges former Senior Attorney at Apple with Insider Trading, Feb. 13, 2019, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-10.   
30  See Robert Freidel, Beware of Lawyers Bearing Gifts (In rhe Form of Rule 144 Opinions), 
April 4, 2010, available at https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/beware-of-lawyers-bearing-
gifts-with-respect-to-rule-144-opinions-2010-04-14/.   
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resonated among members of the public inclined to see lawyers as 
fixers and hired guns.31   
 Those of us who have spent time with (or were) corporate 
lawyers know that the public perceptions are stereotypes, and 
that the vast majority of corporate lawyers present as “good 
people.”  This invites us to think in terms of behavioral 
explanations when—like Clark Clifford—they are accused of 
doing bad things.  But if it were possible, what would a deep moral 
census of corporate lawyers reveal?  How willing are lawyers to 
willingly step over the legal line to aid a client’s economic 
interests, after having made the Holmesian “bad man” risk 
calculation as to both client and self?  Or assuming that legal and 
reputational risk has properly been managed, how many of them 
would do harm to another simply because the client’s self-interest 
called for it?  The latter recreates the laboratory situation that 
started the field of behavioral ethics: measuring the incidence of 
cheating under circumstances where there are real gains to be 
had and zero chance of detection.  I have no idea what that census 
would reveal regarding the state of professional responsibility 
among business lawyers, other than the strong suspicion that 
lawyers’ ethics and respect for law run along a lengthy spectrum 
and that clients sniff out these preferences to match their own.  
Much of this, as noted earlier, tends toward apathy. 
 There are a number of findings in behavioral ethics to 
support the idea that lawyers would be particularly susceptible to 
slippery slopes.  There is norm ambiguity: the ample (and largely 
aspirational) principles of professional responsibility for the 
public good sit in the shadow of counter-balancing demands of 
zealous representation, confidentiality and loyalty.  Ample 
research shows that people will cheat in the interest of significant 
 
31 60 Minutes: Anonymous Inc., Aug. 28, 2016, available at 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hidden-camera-investigation-money-laundering-60-minutes/.   
This led to bar disciplinary proceedings against some of those caught in the sting. 
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others to a greater extent than for their own good.32  Helping a 
client out via what is processed cognitively as a benign and not 
unreasonable step into the ethical gray area comes easily, even 
though it then moves the baseline for next time.  Lawyers covet 
being thought of as problem-solvers for their clients, which puts 
pressure on them to live up to expectations as a matter of 
professional identity.  Interviews with law-breakers reveal how 
the first steps toward abject criminality in business settings were 
often by people who did a little too much not to let others down, 
and then couldn’t stop once committed to the course of action (a 
form of cognitive dissonance).33   
  The often subjective nature of the law also makes the slope 
more slippery.  As with ethical precepts, vague legal principles 
invite interpretation in a self-serving fashion, without awareness 
of the biased construal.  Yuval Feldman, most notably, has done 
considerable work on the connection between legal ambiguity 
and actions that set a course toward questionable judgment at 
least, and a heightened risk of subsequent violations.34   
 Next is the matter of culture and group identity, which to an 
extent goes back to self-definition as a reliable problem-solver.35  
There is a very famous study of cheating behavior, where the 
subjects were all European bankers.36  Their conduct in the 
control conditions were little different from other professionals—
moderate cheating behavior at most.  But one group of subjects 
had their identities as bankers primed just before the testing, and 
this group had higher rates of dishonesty.  I am not aware that a 
comparable study has been done of lawyers, but it would be 
 
32  Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, Self-Serving Altruism: The Lure of Unethical Actions that 
Benefit Others, 93 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 285 (2013). 
33  See Clinton Free & Pamela Murphy, The Ties that Bind: The Decision to Co-offend in Fraud, 
32 Contemp. Acct’g Res. 18 (2015); see also Soltes,, supra, at 155, 
34  See Feldman, supra; Yuval Feldman & Doran Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created 
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 980 (2009). 
35  Soltes, supra, at 189, 233. 
36 Alain Cohn et al., Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry, 516 Nature 86 
(2014). 
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interesting to see what that would invoke cognitively.  Whatever 
the finding, I think it would be a glimpse into precisely how—in 
terms of ethics—the role of lawyering is interpreted by lawyers 
themselves.   
 Tying all this together for our purposes is the concept of 
ethical depletion.37  Research shows that being ethical is harder 
cognitive work than giving into temptation.  So resisting 
temptation depletes energy over time; tiredness and stress, in 
turn, increases the likelihood of further cheating.  And corporate 
lawyers, by all accounts, inhabit workplaces filled with stamina-
challenging workloads, along with many other competitive 
stressors tied to promotion, status and compensation.  Greater 
cheating is associated with falling just short of goals and achieving 
competitive success.38   
 The slippery slope would have less danger were the earliest, 
largely innocent, steps subject to corrective feedback in terms of 
being called out for the behavior, or maybe even sanction.  That is 
indeed an important intervention in building good ethics and 
compliance.  But here again, various forces conspire against this 
kind of discipline.  Various cognitive biases affect supervisors and 
peers so as to make them less willing and able to perceive and act 
on warning signs.39  Even when the conduct crosses the line into 
actual illegality, enforcement resources and incentives are such 
that only a small fraction of wrongdoing is detected and dealt with 
via sanction.  In that sense, as I’ve written elsewhere, the absence 
of negative feedback adds ice to the slope by allowing ethical and 
 
37  See David Welsh & Lisa Ordonez, The Dark Side of Consecutive High Performance Goals: 
Linking Goal Setting, Depletion and Unethical Behavior, 121 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Processes 
79 (2014); Anne Joosten et al., Being In Control Can Make You Lose Control: The Role of Self-
regulation in Unethical Leadership Behavior, 121 J. Bus. Ethics 1 (2014). 
38  See Amos Schurr & Ilana Ritov, Winning a Competition Predicts Dishonest Behavior, 113 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 1754 (Feb. 16, 2016). 
39  Francesca Gino & Max Bazerman, When Misconduct Goes Unnoticed: The Acceptability of 
Gradual Erosion in Others’ Unethical Behavior, 45 J. Exp. & Soc. Psych. 708 (2009). 
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legal risk-takers to claim greater status and rewards.40  They 
become the winners, and their style of behavior—the can-do, 
aggressive client-server—becomes something to be envied and 
copied.   
 I realize that what I have done here is largely to make a 
somewhat updated case for a behavioral approach to 
understanding corporate lawyers’ ethical behavior—why good 
lawyers, however sanctimonious, may act less ethically than the 
professional ideal and do things somewhere along the spectrum of 
bad acts.  This still leaves open what they are conscious of as they 
misbehave—the degree of culpable intent in any given case.  But 
the more I think about the slippery slope, the more I see it in 
terms of wearing down the protective defenses of lawyers caught 
in high stress settings.  We should at least think about this 
dynamic of professional apathy, and the cultural effects it is likely 
to generate. 
 
III. IN-HOUSE: LESSONS FROM FINANCIAL ECONOMICS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 The British studies demonstrating such considerable ethical 
apathy focused on lawyers in elite law firms.  As noted, some 
portion of this can be explained by shifts in the demand for legal 
services, which may not value long-standing lawyer-client 
relationships so much as “just in time” specialist interventions, 
robbing the attorney of the ability to develop the deep familiarity 
with the client and the build-up of trust and credibility necessary 
to take a strong ethical stance. My suspicion is that that what we 
hear from these lawyers is either a form of total depletion at the 
bottom of the slippery slope or (from the more junior ones who 
 
40   Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable, supra, at 503-04. 
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haven’t yet succumbed) the expression of an internal firm-wide 
culture that signals that form of ethical surrender.   
 That shift in private practice was accompanied by a rapid 
growth in the power and authority of the in-house general counsel 
(and her team) as the ones who select and supervise the 
outsiders.41  This role expansion also brought with it the ability to 
internalize more expert competencies, such that outside law firms 
had less to do (and thus competed more vigorously with each 
other for the externalized work).  So an obvious point to consider 
is that whatever gatekeeping role might have been played by 
outside counsel was itself internalized, so that we have to look 
there for evidence of its presence or absence.  In his admirable 
writings on the contemporary role of the general counsel, Ben 
Heineman makes the somewhat optimistic claim that in-house 
counsel “operate seamlessly in business teams, gaining credibility 
by helping more swiftly to achieve performance goals and by 
assisting business leaders promote high integrity down the line 
inside the corporation,” the result of which is a “smaller total legal 
spend (inside plus outside) for the company.”42 
 Heineman’s view runs up against the image of the in-house 
lawyer as the CEO’s loyal consigliere, ready to do what it takes to 
promote the corporate agenda, not to be anybody’s good 
conscience.  While that caricature is surely over-drawn, doubts 
about internal professional independence abound.  For this 
reason, in-house lawyers have been studied in depth.  Most of the 
work here uses the tools of sociology and cultural anthropology—
learning what goes on inside the firm by observing and asking.  
Nelson and Nelson’s tripartite division of in-house lawyers into 
 
41  The contributions to this colloquium by Eli Wald and Omari Scott Simmons illuminate these 
developments.   
42  Ben W. Heineman Jr., The Rise of the General Counsel, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sep. 27, 2012.  See 
generally BEN W. HEINEMAN JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE PARTNER-
GUARDIAN TENSION (2016). 
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“cops, counsel and entrepreneurs” is a justly famous rendering.43  
But as noted earlier, there are doubters who wonder how well 
ethnography and structured interviews get deeply into what is 
actually believed and done inside societal institutions as opposed 
to what is revealed to strangers.  Even trained observers may see 
what they want to see amidst the fog.  My intention here is not to 
weigh in on subjectivity and rigor except to say that the 
methodological criticism has led some sociologists to a more 
quantitative, data-driven approach to empirical observation.  That 
has led to an interesting convergence with work in financial 
economics, which has long used the same quantitative methods as 
the gold standard for proof as to testing how preferences and 
behaviors match the predictions of economic theory.  In the last 
decade, and mainly with respect to the general counsel, this has 
been put to work to understand corporate lawyering. 
 The results are interesting, if far from determinative.  
Perhaps the best known is by Morse et al.,44 who estimate that 
general counsel are nearly half as important as CEO preferences in 
determining outcomes over a range of activities involving 
financial reporting, compliance monitoring and business 
development.  This is a surprisingly large effect.  Other work 
shows how senior corporate lawyers affect accounting choices, 
reporting quality, voluntary disclosure policy, and insider trading 
enforcement, mostly for the better as general counsel prominence 
increases. A natural subject of inquiry is whether the 
compensation packages of general counsel affect these outcomes, 
especially when laden with stock options and other incentives.  
Here, Morse et al. show that high powered incentives cause the 
general counsel to redirect time and attention away from general 
compliance monitoring toward strategic business development 
 
43  Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nelson, Cops, Counsel and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role 
of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 L. & Soc. Rev. 457 (2000).   
44  Adair Morse et al., Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Strategic Officers?, 59 J. L. & Econ. 
847 (2016). 
20 
 
activity, which has a more immediate payoff.  As a result, they 
prevent some 25% fewer breaches.  So incentives do seem to 
matter. 
 This is important research for lawyers to pay attention to,45 
even if some of the assumptions about the law will occasionally 
cause legally-trained readers to cringe.  Much of the discussion 
refers to the presumed gatekeeper role of the in-house lawyer, 
suggesting that the good news in terms of disclosure and the like 
demonstrates good gatekeeper behavior while increasing risk 
tolerance, for example, evidences bad gatekeeping.  But that does 
not show whether the lawyer is doing anything more than 
keeping the client out of trouble.  Morse et al. even push back 
against the idea that the shift in attention to more strategic 
functions is an abandonment of a crucial gatekeeper role, claiming 
that if more attention to strategy is profitable vis-à-vis the risks of 
not catching violations, there is nothing necessarily wrong from a 
corporate governance perspective. 
 Gatekeeping implies more, however, in terms of a 
commitment to law-abidingness (and perhaps other integrity-
based values) whether or not justified by cost-benefit calculations.  
We have no direct evidence in these particular studies of pay-offs 
one way or the other in terms of who benefits or is harmed by 
more intense monitoring—the firm itself, its managers, 
shareholders or some more diffuse set of stakeholders?   
 That, of course, is the subject of corporate governance.  
While the law is famously murky, there is plenty of rhetoric about 
the duty of (long-term) shareholder wealth maximization that 
seems to suggest that individual strategic choices are a matter of 
business judgment so long as they stay within the known confines 
 
45  Not all of the analysis is optimistic. For a more jaundiced view of the evidence, see S. Burcu 
Avci & H. Nejat Seyhun, Why Don’t General Counsels Stop Corporate Crime?, 19 U. Pa. J. Bus. 
L. 751 (2016-17).  This draws from evidence on who reports corporate crime, where in-house 
lawyers are not high on the list. 
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of the law.  If so, then the studies seem to suggest that all is 
(relatively) well, but any more capacious role for gatekeeping is 
unrealistic.   
 But Heineman makes a good case for advice that merges law 
and ethics, delivered with acute sensitivity to chain of command 
and business constraints.  Public companies, especially, can face 
harsh legal and reputational consequences by mishandling a 
manageable threat so that it turns into a disaster for the company.  
As we saw, there is data supporting the view that general counsels 
do often act as gatekeepers, so long as their pay packages are 
properly aligned with that function.  Wise CEOs should welcome 
their advice.  By way of one provocative example, the economists 
Harrison Hong and Inessa Liscovich46 provide evidence that 
attention to corporate social responsibility correlates with more 
leniency in criminal prosecutions against corporations for 
violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
 So perhaps the powers that be should appreciate and 
encourage such ethical proactivity.  But that style of general 
counsel work is contingent on prioritization by the CEO and 
(arguably) key members of the board of directors.  Some of this is 
directly about agency costs inside the company: the senior 
management team may, out of preference or pressure, be shifting 
its focus to the short-term in ways that may instruct the general 
counsel to be aggressive in response to all threats to the status 
quo, a threat-rigidity response.  In principle, the CEO may want 
wise counsel about the company’s reputational and legal risk.  In 
reality, that may be processed through a very self-serving point of 
view. While that is surely a risk, there are pressures on boards to 
take a stronger role in legal compliance, and reforms (in board 
compensation, for example) that could be employed to motivate 
this.   Only when a general counsel is willing to make the board 
 
46  Harrison Hong & Inessa Liskovich, Crime, Punishment and the Value of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492202.   
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fully informed of tough situations will there be the support 
needed to pursue the best interest of the corporation rather than 
the self-interest of those caught in too deep—even if the result of 
greater candor is to raise the board’s own liability exposure a 
bit.47   
 The evidence seems to be that significant numbers of 
general counsel do their job well, though how they do so remains 
opaque.  But culture matters.  Good examples of cultures likely to 
cut off the would-be gatekeeper are not hard to find—Tesla is a 
good one, apparently.  Elizabeth Pollman has written about the 
not-unusual company (think Uber) that celebrates its role as 
disrupter in pushing the envelope—or deliberately crossing the 
line—on legal compliance in the name of innovation.48  That was a 
back-story at Enron, where there was a grandiose internal belief 
that the company was creating a new paradigm for the delivery of 
energy around the world in the face of entrenched habits and 
mindless rules.  They deserved to be violated.  Of course, the 
slippery slope is at work here, with a large sucking machine at the 
bottom speeding up the downward slide as ethical 
accommodations multiply.  
 This is just to emphasize the contingency of in-house 
gatekeeping.  Many corporate leaders will see the value; many 
others don’t.  So Heineman is right to urge careful due diligence 
on general counsel candidates to look deeply into the prevailing 
climate at any given opportunity.  But that is very hard—culture 
reveals itself only after rites of passage are faithfully completed—
especially for someone who really wants the job.  And it doesn’t 
much matter if the person that anxious to be a good gatekeeper 
 
47   A reading of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Birmingham Ret. System v. 
Good, 177 A.3d 47 (Del. 2017) is a troubling example of a board that avoids personal liability 
because they did not know enough, and where the company’s lawyers lack of candor may have 
contributed.  Obviously, good corporate governance sometimes requires putting a board in a tough 
spot. 
48   E.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 Duke L.J. – (2018); see also Elizabeth 
Pollman & Jordan Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 383 (2017). 
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doesn’t get that job offer from the corporate thrill-seekers in the 
first place. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Essays about professional responsibility should try to end 
on a hopeful note, so I can’t stop at the previous sentence.  Nor do 
I want to fall prey to naïve (or motivated) cynicism, which 
psychologists have identified as the common over-estimation of 
the selfishness (or apathy) of others so as to rationalize 
responsive self-serving behavior by the observer.  Good and bad 
ethics are contagious, so that a downward spiral in morality can 
be performative even if the underlying behavioral assumptions 
are inaccurate and might someday be exposed as such. 
 That said, I don’t think that the institutional structures exist 
to motivate more than the minimum of gatekeeping by corporate 
lawyers. I keep coming back to the image of the dimming 
amygdala.  Law firm cultures are doing other work that does not 
include drawing attention to public needs; individual lawyers 
become depleted in the face of stress.  Clients are to be served, 
with appreciation for the assignment, not skepticism about its 
motives.  The demand side has won triumphantly.  So the supply 
side (the corporate legal profession itself) is not going to be the 
best place to find something better. 
 Rather, we have to look to the demand side, and pose the 
question of whether corporate governance has something to add.  
The “business case for ethics” or “ethics pays” approach is 
problematic, of course—justifying ethics based on its pay-off 
monetizes morality and deprives it of its core function in 
promoting goodness as a stand-alone virtue.  And so many 
scandals seem not to give us much hope that good ethics is 
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pervasive in highly-competitive organizations.  I have given much 
of my scholarly attention to explaining why that is so, thereby 
polishing my credentials as a pessimist. 
 But I believe that this perspective, while solidly based and 
descriptively accurate, is socially constructed and thereby 
contingent.  That’s where the financial economics work is so 
interesting—there are, it seems, significant numbers of firms that 
welcome good gatekeeping, just as there are many more that do 
not.  The corporate social license (i.e., the demands of publicness) 
is increasingly difficult to earn, and easily put at risk.  A good 
general counsel is a prized commodity in managing that risk, if 
supported by the CEO, the board and—under the best of 
conditions—the internal corporate culture.  Ben Heineman’s 
model, in other words.   
 That model goes in competition with the opposite: the 
attack dog general counsel willing to do whatever it takes to win, 
supported by like-minded bosses and more grease-laden cultures.  
Many will confidently place their bets on the latter, and they may 
be right, especially in the zeitgeist of today’s ill-spirited political 
economy.  But I’ve seen enough research on sustainability, human 
capital, halo effects and the like to, for now, hold onto my chips 
and, if the odds make it worthwhile, even bet some on the good 
guys.  In other words, I can dimly see a future (without predicting 
one) where the norms of corporate governance shift to favor firms 
with genuinely influential general counsels who speak both law 
and ethics.49  If so, given the demand side dominance of the 
profession, the image of the lawyer-gatekeeper may be 
reawakened throughout the profession, shaking it out of its 
apathy and nudging it off the slippery slope.   
 
 
49  This is not an entirely new hope.  See Harwell Wells, “All Lawyers are Somewhat Suspect:” 
A.A. Berle and the Modern Legal Profession, 42 Seattle U. L. Rev. 641 (2019). 
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